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ARE YOU MY MOTHER?': THE LEGAL OBSTACLES OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem medicine, specifically assisted reproductive technology,
has surpassed legislative action in many jurisdictions around the
country.2 These new medical practices present many significant legal
problems with which the courts and legislators struggle.3 Lawmakers
are forced to examine the existing substantive law to determine if the
legal system can adequately handle the ramifications of advanced
technological discoveries. 4 This comment will begin with an analysis
of the legal history of assisted reproductive technology in three different states, each with a substantial number of court decisions on the
issue of parental rights. Further, this comment will explore the case
of first impression recently decided by the highest court in Massachusetts, concluding with an analysis of what can be expected of reproductive law in the future.
The different practices grouped under the umbrella of assisted
reproductive technology afford individuals the opportunity to procreate when biology and nature cannot perform on their own.' Heterologous artificial insemination ("AID") is the method whereby a
woman is impregnated with semen from a man who is not her husband.6 This procedure carries the most significant legal problem with
P.D.

EASTMAN,

ARE YOU MY MOTHER? (Beginner Books Division of

Random House, Inc.) (1960).

' See John Ellement, Mass. Pushed into Birth-Rights Arena, Boston Globe,

Sept. 10, 1997 at B1 (recognizing the court will decide an issue where science
has moved ahead of law).
' See id. (outlining problems as to definition of rights of birth mother,
couple who hired her, and child).
4 See id. (requiring court to look at any current laws related to
the issue).
' See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for
Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 465 (1983) (introducing the idea of assisted
reproductive technology).
6 See Sherwyn v. California State Dep't, 173 Cal. App. 3d 52,
56, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 778, 780 (1985) (describing procedure involved in AID).
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the determination of who should bear the paternity obligation-the
donor or the woman's husbandl 7 Homologous artificial insemination
("AIH") poses fewer legal ramifications because the woman is impregnated with the semen of her husband and the child conceived is
the biological child of both the woman and her husband.s Combined
artificial insemination ("CAI") is a method in which the woman is inseminated with a combination of her husband's semen and that of a
donor.9 CAI does not pose the same legal problems as AID because
the mix of donor sperm allows a court to presume that the husband is
the biological father. 10
Different from artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization and
surrogate motherhood introduce the problems of establishing both
maternity and paternity." In vitro fertilization can be performed by
merging the egg and sperm of one couple to be carried to term by a
second female or it can be performed by taking the sperm of the husband and fertilizing the egg of a second woman to then be carried by
the wife.12 Similarly, there are two techniques under the umbrella of
surrogate motherhood, both of which pose parentage issues. 13 The
legal problem with traditional surrogacy is that the baby is genetically
'See id. (outlining problems associated with AID).
'See id. (describing procedure and problems associated with AIH).
9 See Wadlington, supra note 5 at 469 (1983) (describing procedure of
CA).
'0 See id. (explaining why CAI does not present as many problems as
AID).
" See Sherwyn, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 56-57, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 781
(identifying problems of in vitro fertilization and surrogacy). Parentage problems
result because at least one of the intended parents is not biologically related to
the child. Id.
2 See Wadlington, supra note 5 at 473 (1983) (describing the two forms of
in vitro fertilization).
13 See id. at 475 (detailing the problems traditional
surrogacy and
gestational surrogacy pose). In a traditional surrogacy situation, a woman
conceives a child by AID, carries it to term and relinquishes the baby to the
sperm donor after birth. Id. Gestational surrogacy differs because the surrogate
is impregnated through in vitro fertilization with the merged egg and sperm of a
married couple. Id. at 474.
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related to the surrogate mother, not the wife of the sperm donor. 4
Traditionally, with both forms of surrogacy, a contract is signed by
the surrogate whereby she agrees to carry the baby to term with the
intention of turning the baby over to the couple after its birth." Because of the varying legal problems which arise from the different
methods of assisted reproductive technology, lawmakers need to draft
legislation to resolve the controversies.
II. HISTORY
A. New Jersey
In 1988, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided one of the
most important and controversial cases involving assisted reproductive technology.' 6 In the Matter of Baby MW7 forced the court to
confront the issue of surrogate motherhood and the legality of the
surrogate contract used by the parties."8 The facts of the case involved the artificial insemination of a woman, Mary Beth Whitehead,
with the semen of William Stem, a man who was not her husband. 19
Mrs. Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract with Mr. Stem
whereby she agreed to conceive the child, carry it to term and after its
birth surrender the child to its natural father and his wife for adoption.2° The contract provided for a payment to Mrs. Whitehead of
$10,000 for her services. 2' At the time the contract was created, the
Parentage Act in existence in New Jersey provided for a presumption
,4See id at 475 (resulting in biological mother possibly wishing to
maintain maternal rights).
"5See Sherwyn, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 57, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (posing
problems when surrogate refuses to turn baby over to couple).
16 See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537
A.2d 1227 (forcing the court to
decide the fate of a contract that would provide a new way of bringing children
into a family).
17109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988).
" See id. (identifying the problems surrounding surrogacy and surrogacy
contracts).
'9Id. at 411-12, 537 A.2d at 1235.
20Id. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1235.
21

id.
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of paternity on the part of the mother's husband. 2 To prevent any
problems, Mr. Whitehead became a party to the contract and promised to do all the necessary acts to rebut the presumption. 23 After the
birth of the child, initially named Sara Elizabeth Whitehead, Mrs.
Whitehead realized that she could not part with the child.2 4 After
time, however, she did reluctantly turn the child over to the Sterns as
stipulated in the contract.2 5 Later, the Sterns, fearful of the continuing unstable mental condition of Mrs. Whitehead, agreed to Mrs.
Whitehead's request to turn the child, who they named Melissa, over
to the surrogate for one week. 6 When Mrs. Whitehead refused to
return Melissa to the Sterns, Mr. Stern filed a complaint to enforce
the surrogacy contract and the courts became involved in the situation. 7
Upon learning of the court's involvement, the Whiteheads fled to
Florida with the child. 28 A Florida court enforced the New Jersey
court order requiring the Whiteheads to turn over the child.2 9 The
New Jersey court reaffirmed the ex parte prior order, awarding custody of the child to the Sterns pendente lite, however, the court also
awarded Mrs. Whitehead limited visitation with Baby M pending final
judgment.3 ° The Sterns' complaint sought possession and ultimate
custody of the child, enforcement of the surrogacy contract, termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, and permission for Mrs.
Stern to adopt the child. 31 The Superior Court, Chancery Division/Family Part, held that the surrogacy contract was valid and or22

See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1236 (requiring Mr.

Whitehead to rebut the presumption of paternity under the statute). See also N.J.
STAT. ANN. § § 9:17-43a(1) -44a (West 1993) (listing the steps necessary to
rebut presumption of paternity).
23 See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 412, 537 A.2d at 1236.
24
21
26

id.

Id. at 414-15, 537 A.2d at 1236-37.
Id. at 415, 537 A.2d at 1237.

27id.
28 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
29 Id.

'0Id. at 416, 537 A.2d at 1237.
" Id. at 417, 537 A.2d at 1237.
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dered that Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights be terminated and that
sole custody of the child be granted to Mr. Stem with an order allowing Mrs. Stem to adopt Melissa.32 In determining whether the
surrogacy contract was valid, the superior court focused its opinion
on the best interest of the child.33 Upon appeal, however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey looked to the best interest of the child
34
solely to determine the issue of custody.
Upon analysis of the superior court's decision, the supreme court
determined that the superior court's review of the issue involving the
surrogacy contract differed from its own." The superior court concluded that the various statutes governing adoption, termination of
parental rights, and payment of money in connection with adoptions,
do not apply to surrogacy contracts because the legislature did not
have surrogacy contracts in mind when enacting those laws.3 6 The
supreme court, on the other hand, held that the surrogacy contract
was in direct conflict with existing statutes and public policy of the
state, and was therefore invalid.37 The supreme court also decided
that the surrogacy contract conflicted with statutes prohibiting the use
of money in connection with adoptions; statutes requiring proof of
parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental
rights; and statutes making the surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private adoptions. 3' The supreme court finally
32See

id. at 417, 537 A.2d at 1237 (citing lower court decision 217 N.J.

Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987)).
" See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 418, 537 A.2d at 1238 (determining
validity of contract based on what is best for the child).
4 Id. The supreme court believed that the analysis by the trial court was
inconsistent and states that the trial court awarded custody to Mr. Stem based on
evidence and analysis that would have taken place had there been no surrogacy
contract. Id. The trial court ultimately thought the contract was irrelevant. Id.
" See id. (reviewing contract for different reasons than lower court).
36 See id. at 418, 537 A.2d at 1238 (deciding that current statutes don't
apply).
17 See id. at 421-22, 537 A.2d at 1239-40
(disagreeing with lower court's
analysis).
" See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240 (deciding that
contract conflicts with current statutes). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 9:3-54a,

316

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATEADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

held that the surrogacy contract directly conflicted with New Jersey's
public policy which (1) aims to keep children with and to be reared by
both of their natural parents, (2) affords equal rights concerning the
child to both natural parents, (3) aims to keep the consent for the surrender of a child as an informed decision for the surrogate, and (4)
looks to the best interest of the child in determining custody.3 9 Despite the invalidity of the surrogacy contract, the supreme court
awarded custody to the child's natural father and his wife based on an
analysis of the child's best interest. 40 The natural mother retained her
parental rights, entitling her to visitation with the child. 4' The Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in dicta that the present laws of
New Jersey do not pose any legal prohibition to surrogacy when the
surrogate mother volunteers, without any payment, to act as a surrogate and is given the right to change her mind and to assert her parental rights. 42 This comment leaves the door open to the legislature
to deal with the issue as it sees fit, and in the way most advantageous
to the people who would benefit from procedures such as surrogacy
while minimizing the risk to the community at large.43
The New Jersey courts have confronted the issues surrounding
artificial insemination as well as those surrounding the surrogacy
contract found in In the Matter of Baby M In CM v. C C 44, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cumberland County, New
Jersey heard a case involving a woman who underwent artificial insemination with the sperm of a known donor. 45 The sperm bank denied the individuals the use of its facilities, so the individuals suc-

9:2-16,-17, 9:3-41, 30:4C-23, 9:2-14, 9:2-14 and 9:2-16 (West 1993) (describing
statutes present with which the surrogacy contract conflicts).
'9 See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 434-38, 537 A.2d 1246-49 (holding
contract violated public policy).
40Id. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259.
41Id. at 466, 537 A.2d at 1263.
42See id. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264 (outlining one way surrogacy
contract
may be upheld).
43See id. (encouraging action by legislators).
152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977).
45 id.
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cessfully attempted the insemination at home. 46 The donor, C.M.,
assumed that he would undertake the paternal role in the child's life,
however, C.C. did not want that.47 This conflict led to the application
by C.M. for visitation rights to the baby. 48 In this case of first impression, the court looked to other jurisdictions confronted with the issue
of the paternity of a child conceived through artificial insemination.49
The court reviewed decisions by both the Supreme Court of New
York and the Supreme Court of California and decided that "[i]f an
unmarried woman conceives a child through artificial insemination
from semen from a known man, that man cannot be considered to be
less a father because he is not married to the woman." 50 Finally, the
court held that the voluntary decision by C.M. to participate in the
procedure which led to the conception of a child, should place on him
the responsibilities of fatherhood, including the right to visitation as
well as support and maintenance of the child. 5'
The ramifications of artificial insemination reach to areas beyond
52 Issues of support, upon divisitation, as illustrated in CMv.C.C.
vorce, for children born during the course of a marriage who were
conceived by artificial insemination are found in K.S. v. G.S.,5 3 de46/d.at

161, 377 A.2d at 821.

47 id.

48Id.

49See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. at 162, 377 A.2d at 822 (using case

law from other states for assistance).
" Id. at 167, 377 A.2d at 824. This decision upholds the policy favored by
the courts which requires that a child be provided with a father as well as a
mother and provides the court with the necessary leeway in determining what is
in the best interest of the child in granting visitation without making distinctions
between those children conceived naturally or artificially. Id. See generally
People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (Sup. Ct.
1968); Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct.
1973); Stmad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Gursky
v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
" See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 168, 377 A.2d 821, 825 (holding
that paternity imposes requirements on father, even if by artificial insemination).
52 See id. (indicating that support is an issue as well as visitation).
3182 N.J. Super. 102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981).
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cided by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division.5 4 The
parties involved were married, but unable to conceive because of the
husband's prior voluntary vasectomy." The parties decided to attempt artificial insemination and met with a specialist in the field of
fertility who explained the procedure. 56 This specialist was then given
oral consent by the defendant/husband to the procedure.57 After a
miscarriage, the husband initially urged his wife to continue the procedure, but alleges he later changed his mind due to the cost of the
procedures, and told his wife to stop the treatments.58 The wife continued with her treatments and after a pregnancy was confirmed, her
husband left her, stating that he objected to her pregnancy.5 9 Soon
after the birth of the child, the wife filed for divorce and sought support for the child. 60 The court was faced with the issue of whether
support obligations may be imposed on the husband who has never
seen the child or contributed previously to its support. 61 Statutes enacted in other states address the problem of paternal obligations created by artificial insemination and uniformly impose marital obligations when the husband consented to the procedure.62 The court
compared the aspect of consent for artificial insemination for determining paternity with nonaccess of the putative father at the time of
conception prior to, or during a marriage. 63 Based on this compari54 id.

51Id. at

104, 440 A.2d at 65.

56Id.
"

Id. Neither in 1981, nor presently, does New Jersey require written

consent be obtained by a physician prior to the beginning of artificial
insemination procedures. Id.
58K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super at 104-05, 440 A.2d at 66.
'9Id. at 105, 440 A.2d at 66.
60 Id.
61

See id. (deciding issue of support obligations of man who was involved

in artificial insemination procedure).
62 See id. at 106, 440 A.2d at 66 (citing statutes from other states imposing
support obligations). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1975) and N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988) (requiring support payments of husband
who consents to artificial insemination procedure).
61 See K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super. at 107, 440
A.2d at 67 (determining
importance of consent of husband).
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son, the court decided that it is practical, because of the difficulty in
proving consent, to apply a rebuttable presumption criterion to determine the existence of consent at a certain time.6 4 Therefore, the
court held that consent, once given, is presumed to be effective at the
time of conception unless the husband establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he revoked or rescinded his consent.6" Without
clear evidence, the defendant was declared the lawful father of the
child conceived through artificial insemination and therefore held
some responsibility for the support of the child.66 In deciding cases
involving the use of artificial insemination, the court attempts, whenever possible, to provide the child with both a mother and a father,
and will prevent individuals from shirking the responsibility that
comes with parenthood.67
B. New York
New York courts decided cases involving artificial reproductive
technology long before the courts in New Jersey. 68 As was mentioned in the CM v. CC case, the court looked to the cases from
New York for assistance in making its decision. 69 The first case from
New York is Strnad v. Strnad ° which deals with the issue of the artificial insemination of a woman with the sperm of a donor not her husband, but with her husband's consent.71 Julie Strnad brought the
court action against her husband, Antoine, involving the custody of

6,See id. at 109, 440 A.2d at 68 (applying rebuttable presumption criteria
to determine consent).
65 See id. at 109-10, 440 A.2d at 68-69 (requiring definite revocation of
consent to avoid obligations).
66 See id. at 110, 440 A.2d at 69 (holding husband responsible for support
of child).

id. (attempting to provide two parents and support for all children).
See Stmad v. Stmad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 190 Misc. 786 (1948) (indicating

67See
68

the date of the decision as forty years prior to the Baby M decision).
69See C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. at 167, 377 A.2d at 824 (using case
law from New York as guidance).
'0 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
Id. at 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390.

320

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATEADVOCACY [Vol. IV

her child, Antoinette.72 The court decided that Mr. Strnad was entitled to the same child visitation rights as those acquired by foster parents who formally adopt a child, if not the same rights as those given
to natural parents.73 This decision came from the court's holding that
when a wife undergoes artificial insemination with the consent of her
husband, the child is semi-adopted by the husband.74 Under the same
analysis, the child is therefore not considered illegitimate. 75 The court
looks at the child conceived through artificial insemination as no different from a child born out of wedlock who is then made legitimate
by law upon the marriage of the interested parties. 76 This was the
first case where the legitimacy of a child conceived through a method
of assisted reproductive technology was discussed, however, the
court did not make any determination on the legal consequences of
the legitimacy of the child with regard to property rights.77

In 1963, the Supreme Court of New York again faced the issue
of artificial insemination of a woman, by a donor not her husband,
with the written consent of her husband. 78 In this action for annulment brought by Stanley Gursky, the issue surrounded the support of
Minday, a child conceived through artificial insemination. 79 The court
analyzed the concept of legitimacy in both statutory law and common
law. 8 Statutorily, a child whose natural father is not married to her

72Id.
73See

id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92 (deciding that husband involved in
artificial insemination given visitation rights).
74See id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391 (entitling husband to same rights
of
visitation as those who adopt children).
71See Strnad, 190 Misc. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391 (using comparison
to
adoption to make children legitimate).
76 See id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (determining
status of child born by
artificial insemination).
77See id. (deciding property rights and moral questions connected with
this
issue not appropriate here).
7' Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406
(1963).
79Id. at

1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.

'0 See id. at 1085, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408-09 (using all legal means in
existence for guidance).
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mother is illegitimate regardless of the marital status of the mother.8 "
The court also commented on the only other New York case dealing
with the subject, Strnad v. Strnad, stating that there was no legal
precedent supporting that decision, which was actually in contradiction with the statute dealing with adoption.8 2 For additional assistance, the court looked to a Cook County Superior Court decision
which held that heterologous artificial insemination by a third party
donor, with or without the consent of the husband, constitutes adultery on the part of the mother. 83 As a result, a child so conceived is
not a child born in wedlock and is therefore illegitimate.8 4 The Gursky court held that the child, Minday, was not the legitimate issue of
the husband, but concluded that based on the implied contract for
support formed by his written consent to the artificial insemination
procedure, he was liable for the support of the child. 85 Again, the
New York court was unwilling to make any decision upon the personal rights, including property
rights, that the child may have from
86
husband.
the
with
the relation
In addition to decisions concerning artificial insemination, New
York courts have faced issues regarding surrogacy agreements.8 7 In
1986, the Surrogate's Court of Nassau County, New York, decided

See id. at 1086, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (stating that use of artificial
insemination may lead to illegitimate status for child). See also N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 119(a) (McKinney 1988) (indicating that statute was repealed in 1962).
82 See id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (providing no legal manner for
child to be legitimate in Strnad). New York Domestic Relations Law § 110
specifically states that no person shall be adopted except in pursuance thereof.

Id.
" See Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (citing Doornbos
v. Doombos, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956)).
See id. (reiterating illegitimacy of child born by artificial insemination).
" See id. at 1089, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 412 (holding husband to written
consent and requiring support thereby).
86See id. (stating personal rights of child not properly decided here).
87See Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (introducing the court to controversy surrounding surrogacy

agreements).
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Adoption of Baby GirlL.J8 and held that a private placement adoption in which the adoptive child was born to a surrogate mother artificially inseminated by the adoptive father was valid.8 9 The court was
concerned with two issues: (1) the validity of the adoption proceeding, since the parties agreed to the terms prior to the conception and
birth of the child and (2) the possible violation of existing statutes by
the payment of a fee to the surrogate mother." Based on the facts,
the court granted the adoption because it was in the best interest of
the child to live in the home of the petitioners. 9' In deciding the issue
surrounding the payment of a fee to the surrogate mother, the court
found that such arrangements are not void, but voidable because of
the state's adoption statutes which take precedence over any agreement between the parties. 92 If violations of these statutes are found in
the agreements, the contract may be illegal and the petition for adoption may be denied. 93 However, in this case, the court held that the
payment provided for in the agreement between the parties was legitimate under the statute. 94
In 1990, the Family Court of Kings County, New York, refused
to follow the decision a few years earlier in Adoption of Baby Girl

" 132 Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
89 See id. at 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (holding particular surrogacy
arrangement valid).
90See id. at 973, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 814 (describing issues facing the court).
9'Id. at 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
92 See id. at 976, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (holding that surrogacy contracts,
including fees paid to surrogate mother not void). Since the court decision, the
New York legislature has enacted a statute declaring surrogate parenting statutes
contrary to the public policy of New York and therefore void and unenforceable.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1988).
93 See Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d at 978, 505
N.Y.S.2d at
818 (voiding surrogacy contracts that violate New York's adoption statutes).
94 Id. In its decision, the court requested that the
legislature review the
problem of payments to surrogate mothers and determine whether statutory
provisions should be made to allow or disallow the payments and the practice of
surrogate parenting. Id.
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L.J95 In Adoption ofPau,96 Elizabeth A. and Greg T. entered into a
surrogate parenting agreement whereby Elizabeth agreed to be artificially inseminated with Greg's sperm in order to conceive a child who
would be placed into the custody of Greg.97 The agreement provided
for a payment to Elizabeth of $10,000 upon her surrender of custody
of the child. 98 Elizabeth was before the court for the purpose of executing a "Judicial Consent" to the adoption of her son by Greg and his
wife. 99 The adoptive parents did not initially disclose the fee of
$10,000 to be paid to Elizabeth. 100 The court, through analysis of the
agreements submitted as part of the documents in support of the surrender and subsequent adoption, determined that Elizabeth did anticipate receiving a payment in exchange for the execution of the Judicial
Consent. 01 It was this payment that was at issue before the court.0 2
Despite the prior New York case which was squarely on point on the
issue allowing a surrogate contract with a payment provision, this
03
court was unable to approve a fee paid to the surrogate mother.1
The court looked to the law of other jurisdictions as guidance, as
there was no statutory guidance in New York, and concluded that
"the contract at Bar provides for 'the sale of a child, or, at the very
least, the sale of a mother's right to her child', in contravention of the
law of this state."' 0 4 After this decision, surrogate contracts, which
provide for payments to the5 surrogate mother, are void under the law
of the State of New York. 10

9'See Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1990) (determining that surrogacy contract at hand is void under state law).
96 146 Misc. 2d 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1990).
97Id.

at 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 815.

98 Id.

Id. at 380, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Id. at 380, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
'0'
Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d at 381, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
102Id. at 381, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
103See id. (citing Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505
N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986)).
Id. at 385, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
'0'
See id. at 385, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818 (voiding all surrogacy contracts
which provide payments).
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The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York, made a
finding on a gestational surrogacy issue in 1994.106 In the case of
McDonald v. McDonald,0 7 the defendant wife, Olga, was the gestational mother of twins born during her marriage to the plaintiff hus8 Olga was unable to conceive naturally, so the couple
band, Robert. 10
agreed to conceive a child through in vitro fertilization.' 0 9 This procedure mixed the sperm of Robert with the eggs of a female donor,
which were then implanted into Olga's uterus. 10 Sometime after the
twins were born, Robert sought a divorce from Olga and in that action for divorce sought to declare that the children were genetically
and legally his and that he should be granted custody of them."'
Robert's argument was based on the fact that he is the "only genetic
and natural parent available" to the children and therefore his claim
2
for custody should override Olga's who is not the genetic mother."
In deciding the issue of whether Olga is the natural mother of the
children, for the purposes of resolving the issue of custody, the court
looked to prior case law from California and New Jersey. 113 The
court distinguished the present case from In re Baby M because in
this case, the two functions of the female in reproduction were shared
between two women. 114 This "egg donation" scenario is similar to
that of Johnson v. Calve15, because in that case there was a gestational surrogate who carried the fertilized eggs of the married cou-

106

See McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7, 9, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478

(1994) (deciding that gestational surrogate is natural mother).
107 196 A.D.2d 7, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994)
log Id.
109 Id.

110Id.

Id.
12 See McDonald, 196 A.D.2d at 9, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (arguing that
Olga had insignificant claim for custody since only gestational mother).
"' See id. (referring to Johnson v. Calvert and In re Baby M).
14 See id. at 10, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (distinguishing
case where surrogate
was genetic mother from case where anonymous egg donor was involved).
15 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993).
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pie. 1 6 However, the present case is different because Olga, unlike the
surrogate in Johnson, is not genetically related to the children to
which she gave birth. 117 Despite the differences between the present
case and Johnson, the Supreme Court of New York found the reasoning used by the California court to be persuasive. 18 As a result,
the court held that in the present case, Olga, who is the gestational
mother, is the natural mother, and is therefore entitled to temporary
custody of the children with visitation rights given to Robert. "9
C. California
Similar to New Jersey, the Supreme Court of California decided
a case involving a surrogacy contract, but it differed in that it was one
of gestational surrogacy, not traditional surrogacy as was seen in the
Baby Mcase. 120 The suit was brought by a husband and wife seeking
declaration that they were the legal parents of a child born to 21a
woman in whom the couple's fertilized egg had been implanted.
There was a contract signed by the parties which stipulated that Ms.
Johnson would relinquish all parental rights to the child in favor of
Mr. and Mrs. Calvert upon the birth of the child in return for a payment of $10,000 and a $200,000 life insurance policy. 22 The primary
issue in the case was: Who is the child's natural mother under California law? 2 3 The trial court ruled that the Calverts were the child's

116

See id. (citing Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d

494 (1993)).
17 See id. (indicating differences between gestational
surrogate role in two
cases).
"' See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 93, 851 P.2d at 782, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500
(holding woman intending to procreate the child and raise the child as own is
natural mother).
"9 See McDonald, 196 A.D.2d at 12, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (following
analysis of Johnson court).
20See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993)
(introducing potential problems with gestational surrogacy).
121 Id. at 84, 851 P.2d at 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 494.
121 Id. at 87, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
Blood samples obtained from both Ms. Johnson and the baby
123 Id.
excluded Ms. Johnson as the genetic mother. Id.
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"genetic, biological and natural" parents and that Ms. Johnson had no
"parental" rights to the child. 124 In addition, the trial court held that
the surrogacy contract was legal and enforceable against the claims
made by Ms. Johnson. 125 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, Division Three affirmed the
decision of the trial court and the
126
Supreme Court granted review.
California is one of the few states to enact legislation with the
Uniform Parentage Act as its foundation. 127 Under Part 7 of Division
4 of the California Civil Code, §§ 7000-7021, pertinent portions of
the Uniform Parentage Act were encompassed. 12 These sections
deal with the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.129 The Supreme Court of California determined that these statutes apply to any parentage determination, especially those involving
the issue of a child's maternity, and analyzed the facts of this case under the framework of the Act. 130 There are specific provisions of the
Act which address the issue of maternity and recognize both genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing the mother
and child relationship. 131 However, California law recognizes that a
24Id.

at 88, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
.25
Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 88, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
126 id.
127

See

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § §

1-2, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987) (listing the

states which have adopted the Act).
2' See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 88, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496
(adopting concept which bases parent/child rights on existence of parent/child
relationship). See also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § § 1-2, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987),
CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 7001-7021 (West Supp. 1982) (encompassing the concept of
parent/child relationship as different from labels of legitimate and illegitimate
children).
29See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 89, 851 P.2d at 779, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497
(providing that parent/child relationship extends equally to all children and to
parents regardless of marital status).
"0 See id. (using interpretation of statute to decide issue of maternity in
gestational surrogacy case).
232 See CAL. CIV. CODE § § 7003(1), 7004(a), 7015 and UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987) (describing manner in which one can establish
mother/child relationship).
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child has only one natural mother which poses some problems in
cases of reproductive technology where a different outcome may be
biologically possible. 13 2 The court determined that the terms of the
Act are not sufficient to render a fair decision about the maternity of a
child born from reproductive technology.' 33 The many ambiguities
resulting from the procedures are not directly resolved in the Act and
an analysis into the intention of the parties is necessary for the decision making process. 13 4 After thorough analysis, the court concluded
that when the biological functions necessary to bring a child into the
world have been allocated between two women, it is the woman who
intended to procreate the child and raise that child as her own, who is
the natural mother under California law. 135
In addition to the maternity issue in the Johnson v. Calvert case,
the court was faced with determining the validity of the surrogacy
contract.1 36 Ms. Johnson argued that the surrogacy contract violated
the policies underlying the adoption laws of the state because it constituted a prebirth waiver of parental rights. 137 However, the court
disagreed with her and ruled that gestational surrogacy differs from
adoption and is not subject to the adoption statutes.13 8 The court
looked to the purpose of the payments stipulated under the contract
when making their decision. 3 9 Based on the purpose of the payments
132

See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 92, 851 P.2d at 781, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 499

(refusing to recognize more than one natural mother, despite mother/child
relationship).
133 See id. at 93, 851 P.2d at 782, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500 (acknowledging
ambiguity caused by the statute).
134 See id. (concluding intention of parties is deciding factor).
"' See id. (attempting to avoid confusion caused by combining custody
and parentage).
136 See id. at 95, 851 P.2d at 783, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 501 (deciding issues
such as maternity and validity of surrogacy contract).
137 Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 96, 851 P.2d at 784, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 502
(arguing contract unenforceable).
"3 See id. (acknowledging difference between surrogacy contract and
adoption).
"9 See id. (holding payments were compensation for services, not for
giving up parental rights).
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and the intent of the parties, the contract used in the Johnson case did
not violate public policy governing adoption or termination of paren40
tal rights. 1
In 1994, the California Court of Appeals was faced with deciding
41
the issue of the enforceability of a traditional surrogacy contract.'
In re Marriage of Moschetta142 introduced the issue to the court
which defined traditional surrogacy to "mean an arrangement where a
woman is impregnated with the sperm of a married man with the prior
understanding that the resulting child is to be legally the child of the
married man and his infertile wife."' 143 This type of surrogacy presents problems because the surrogate is the woman who gave birth to
the child and also is the "natural" parent of the child, as is the father.'44
In the present case, Robert and Cynthia Moschetta wanted to
start a family, but Cynthia was sterile. 14' The couple met with a surrogacy broker who introduced them to Elvira Jordan, a woman who
agreed to be the surrogate for the Moschettas. 146 Elvira signed a surrogacy agreement which provided that she would be artificially inseminated with Robert's semen so as to give birth to his biological
offspring, to which she would then give Robert sole custody and
control. 147 Elvira also agreed to take all of the necessary steps to assist Cynthia in adopting the child.' 48 The Moschettas began to have
marital problems, of which Elvira learned while in labor and caused

See id. at 95, 851 P.2d at 784, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502 (viewing that the
surrogacy agreement on its face is not inconsistent with public policy).
14 See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App.
4th 1218, 1221, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (1994).
142 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (1994).
143Id. at 1221-22, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 894.
'4Id.
at 1222, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894.
14Ild. at 1223, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 895.
140

146

In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1223, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 895.
141Id.
148 id.
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her to reconsider the surrogacy agreement. 149 She finally relented,
having been told by the Moschettas that they intended to stay married, however, that changed after seven months.' 50 Robert took the
child, Marissa, with him and Cynthia proceeded to file a petition to
establish a parental relationship, alleging that she was the "de facto
mother" of the child.151 The trial court concluded that Robert Moschetta and Elvira Jordan were the legal parents of the child. 15 2 Robert
appealed the trial court's judgment challenging its decision that Elvira
is the legal mother of the child. '
The court looked to the California Supreme Court decision in
Johnsonto determine whether the surrogacy contract with Elvira Jordan was enforceable. 15 4 However, the Johnson court never reached a
decision of whether traditional surrogacy contracts, like the one in the
present case, are enforceable.' 55 The Moschetta court used the analysis of the Johnson court with respect to a gestational surrogacy contract to decide the present issue regarding a traditional surrogacy
agreement.' 56 The situation with the Moschettas and Elvira Jordan
differs from the situation in Johnson because there is no need for a
tie-breaker between the genetic and birth mothers. 15 7 In the present
case, Elvira Jordan did not share the responsibilities with the intended
mother, Olga, but instead, took on the role of both the genetic and
149 Id.

150Id.
...
See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1223, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 895 (asserting parentage due to intent to bear and care for the child).
152 See id. at 1224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895 (granting legal parents joint
legal and physical custody of child).
,' See id. (finding grounds for Cynthia's parentage in Uniform Parentage
Act).
,14See id. at 1228, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899 (ruling that surrogacy contract is
incompatible with rationale and analysis of Johnson).
"' See id. at 1230, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900 (looking to Johnson court's
analysis for assistance).
156 See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1231,
30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 900 (using the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties).
See id. (distinguishing traditional surrogacy from gestational surrogacy
...
where two women have equal claims to maternity).
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birth mother of the child.' 58 Despite these differences, the court determined that the Uniform Parentage Act still applies for ascertaining
parentage and placed that responsibility in the hands of Elvira Jordan.' 59 The court also determined that the surrogacy contract could
not serve as an adoption agreement since the parties did not adhere to
the statute requiring the presence of a social worker at the time the
"birth parents" give consent to adoption. 160 Because parentage was
placed in Elvira Jordan and there was no proper adoption, the Moschetta court declined to enforce the surrogacy agreement between the
Moschettas and Elvira Jordan, resulting in a finding of no parental
relationship for Olga. 161 The court's decision that the traditional surrogacy contract was not enforceable results in couples having no assurance that their intentions to become parents
with the aid of assisted
62
1
honored.
be
will
technology
reproductive
The most recent case involving the use of assisted reproductive
technology decided by the California court is In re Marriageof Buzzanca.63
' In this case, John and Luanne Buzzanca decided to start a
family and to achieve that result, agreed to have an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in a surrogate who would
carry and give birth to a child for them. 164 Following all of the steps
and procedures leading to the birth of Jaycee, John and Luanne divorced and a lawsuit began to determine who are Jaycee's lawful parents. 165 The two individuals who donated the sperm and egg were
anonymous, and like the surrogate mother, made no claim to the

"' See id. (illustrating situation where two usual means of showing
maternity coincide in one woman).
19 See id. (deciding application of statute relevant
in traditional surrogacy
situation).
,60See

id. (applying CAL. FAM. CODE § 8814 (West 1994)).
See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1231, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 901 (placing parental rights in surrogate mother).
162 See id. at 1235, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (causing unrest with couples
desiring use of traditional surrogacy).
163 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998).
'64Id. at 1412, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
161

165

Id.
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child. 166 Despite the fact that John and Luanne were the intended
parents, and that neither the surrogate nor genetic parents wanted the
child, the trial court decided that "Jaycee had no lawful parents." 167
The California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, disagreed with
the trial court stating that the trial judge erred by failing to consider
the body of law establishing fatherhood in ways different from giving
birth or genetics. 168 The appellate court decided that the same reasoning should apply to the Buzzanca's situation as applies to the
situation where a husband consents to the artificial insemination of his
wife, which results in the husband being the lawful father of the
child. 169 Therefore, the Buzzanca's would be deemed the lawful parents of Jaycee, a child genetically unrelated to them born to a surrogate on their behalf 170 The analysis of the Buzzanca court promotes
public policy which favors the establishment of legal parenthood and
the responsibilities that come with it, whenever possible. 171
III. LEGISLATION ON THE ISSUE
Almost ten years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
the Baby M case, Massachusetts was faced with a similar scenario. 172
Massachusetts has no laws or legal precedent specifying the rights of
the parties involved in surrogacy arrangements or whether those

166
Id.
167

See id. (citing lower court decision).

168

See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1412, 72 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 282 (referring to situation where husband consents to wife's artificial
insemination and is deemed child's father).
169 See id. at
1413, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 282 (following reasoning of
Johnson court).
"oSee id. (declaring John and Luanne the lawful parents of Jaycee).
See id. at 1423, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290 (promoting state interest in
providing parents for all children).
172See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. 501, 689 N.E.2d 790 (1998)
171

(indicating the date of the decision as ten years since the Baby M decision).
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agreements are valid contracts. 173 In 1994, two separate bills were
proposed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts House of Representatives which addressed the issue of surrogate parenting arrangements. 174 The bills were never passed, so Massachusetts is still without any legislation on the issue. 175 Some other states have legislation
addressing surrogacy arrangements, however, there is no uniformity
in how states have ruled on the issue. 176 The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act is an attempt by the federal government to outline and provide guidelines for states in handling surrogacy situations. 177 This Act provides two alternatives-one that
makes surrogacy contracts enforceable with court approval, and an78
other that makes surrogacy contracts void as against public policy. 1
As of 1997, only two states, North Dakota and Virginia, adopted any
or all portions of the Act. 179
Even though Massachusetts legislation has not kept pace with the
advances of all assisted reproductive technology, such as surrogacy, it
has enacted some laws to regulate the new means for conception.' 80
171See

generally, R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. 501, 507-08, 689
N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (providing the first case decision addressing surrogacy in
Massachusetts).
"See H.R. 3787, 178th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mass. 1994) (voiding any contract
regarding the transfer of parental rights of a child for valuable consideration as
contrary to public policy); see also H.R. 4544, 178th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mass. 1994)
(proposing that surrogacy contracts shall be void and unenforceable).
05 Id.

See generally R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. 501, 689 N.E.2d 790
(1998) (citing statutes in minority of states which have enacted legislation on the
issue of surrogacy arrangements). Some states have chosen to deny enforcement
of all surrogacy agreements entirely, while others have chosen to deny
enforcement only if the surrogate is to receive compensation. Id.
...
See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § § 5-9,
9B U.L.A. 195 (1998) (proposing two roads for states to take on the issue).
"' See id. (outlining terms of Alternatives A and B).
"9See id. (indicating states where Act has been adopted).
180 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1996)
(outlining maternity of child born as result of artificial insemination); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10(b) (West 1996) (giving custody of child born
176
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In existence is a statute which states that "[a]ny child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of
her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother
and such husband."' 81 In the case of a child born to a single woman
with the assistance of artificial insemination, Massachusetts has enacted a law that gives the mother sole right of custody until there is
an adjudication of paternity which would require both parents to provide support. 1 2 However, under other statutes, there is a presumption of paternity in the husband of a woman who bears a child while
married.' 83 There is no statute creating a presumption of maternity in
the birth mother, however, there is a provision for a cause of action to
establish such maternity. 8 4 Contrary to Massachusetts laws, the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act states that the
birth mother is the legal mother.' 85 As illustrated above, Massachusetts has attempted to rise to the necessary level of legislation for deciding some issues of modern reproductive technology, however,
there are still some gaps that need to be filled.

out of wedlock to mother in absence of adjudication or acknowledgment); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 5 (West 1996) (detailing persons entitled to
maintain actions or execute voluntary acknowledgment of parentage); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 1996) (declaring child born to unmarried
parents same rights and protections of law as all children) and MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 273, § 5 (West 1996) (providing that parent of minor child must
contribute reasonably to support).
S'MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 46, § 4B (West 1996). In R.R. v. M.H. &

Another, this would make the husband of the surrogate, Mr. Hoaglund, the legal
father of the child and would give him all the rights and responsibilities of a
parent, not Mr. Rascoe, the biological father who donated the sperm. Id.
,82
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 10(b) (West 1996) (giving
mother right of custody until adjudication).
"' See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6 (West 1996) (creating a
presumption of paternity in the husband).
114 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 21 (West 1996) (providing
for
a right of action to establish maternity).
'

See

UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT §

U.L.A. 195, 199 (1998) (stating birth mother is legal mother).

2, 9B
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IV. CASE IN CHIEF
Since the Baby M case, there has been an increase in the use of
surrogacy agreements and as a result, there has been more concern
about the legality and enforcement of such agreements. Absent legislation denoting the rights of the biological father, the surrogate
mother and the child, there is confusion and debate surrounding the
contract and the ultimate issue of determining the legal parents of the
child. 1 6 Not until 1998, when the court decided R.R. v. MH.& Anothe, 8 7 did Massachusetts voice an opinion on the issue of surrogacy.188 Massachusetts has no statute expressly relating to surrogacy
agreements, therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") 89looked to
other jurisdictions to see how they handled such situations. 1
In R.R. v. MH. & Another, a married woman, Michelle Hoaglund, a Massachusetts resident, contracted to be a traditional surrogate for a childless married couple, Robert and Margaret Rascoe, of
Rhode Island.'90 Under the contract, the surrogate would receive a
$10,000 payment in installments for her services, but would also keep
her parental right to the baby and her constitutional right to have an
abortion.191 These terms were conditioned upon a return of all payments if she decided to exercise either of those rights. 192 Ms. Hoaglund had already received $6,600 of the payment when she decided
to keep the baby, but she was unable to return the entire amount of
money to the Rascoes. 193 It was upon this decision to keep the baby,
16 See CHARLES KINDREGAN, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 24.8 (2d ed.
1996) (indicating the importance of legislative guidance on this issue).
17 426 Mass. 501, 689 N.E.2d 790 (1998).
188See id. at 502, 689 N.E.2d at 791 (determining specific surrogacy

arrangement of case invalid).
See id. at 501, 689 N.E.2d at 790 (using other state's legislation and
cases for guidance).
190See Ellement, supra note 2 at B 1.
191Id.

192Id.
193

Id.
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and this inability to return the money owed, that the Rascoes demanded in court that the surrogate live up to the contract. 194 The
Worcester Probate and Family Court gave the Rascoes temporary
custody of the baby and allowed Ms. Hoaglund visitation for twelve
hours per week. 95 After the motion for preliminary injunctive relief
was heard in the family court, the questions of law were reported to
the Appeals Court and upon consolidation of all matters, the ("SJC")
transferred the matter on its own initiative because the court had not
previously dealt with such an issue.'96
In this case of first impression, the SJC grappled with the question of the enforceability of the surrogacy agreement. 197 The court
was not asked to discuss the temporary custody order set out by the
family court because the parties had since agreed on a custody arrangement that achieved approval of the family court judge.'98 In deciding the issue surrounding the surrogacy agreement, the court entered into a lengthy discussion of the law in other jurisdictions regarding surrogacy arrangements. 199 The court especially considered
the legislation in place in New Hampshire and Virginia which make
unpaid surrogacy agreements lawful.2 °° In concluding that the surrogacy agreement was unenforceable, the court stated that certain conditions must be met for a surrogacy agreement to rise to the level of
enforceability, but those conditions are not likely to be agreed upon

194id.

'9'See

Ellement, supra note 2 at B 1 (holding that surrogate mother entitled
to visitation rights).
196 See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. at 502,
689 N.E.2d at 791
(taking case out of court of appeals to decide the case of first impression).
'9'
See id. (facing decision of enforcing a surrogacy contract).
198Id.

,99
See id. at 506, 689 N.E.2d at 794 (citing statutes from other states
which differ drastically in their opinion of the enforceability of surrogacy
arrangements).
200 See id. at 507, 689 N.E.2d at 794 (restricting who may act as a
surrogate and requiring advance approval by court). See also N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 168-B:16, 168-B:16(I)(b),

168-B:17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996), VA.

CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 20-159(B), 20-160(B)(4), 20-160(B)(6) (Michie 1995).

336

JOURNAL OF TRL4L & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IV

by the biological father. 20 1 It is for this reason that the court states,

"[a] Massachusetts statute concerning surrogacy agreements, pro or
con, would provide guidance to judges, lawyers, infertile couples interested
in surrogate parenthood and prospective surrogate moth02
ers."

2

In reaching its conclusion, the SJC analyzed some of the legisla-

tion already in place in Massachusetts that is related to the issue of
surrogacy arrangements. 0 3 One law in place recognizes and accepts

artificial insemination as a procedure resulting in a form of surrogate
fatherhood.20 4 The case at hand differs because it is the wife who is
the infertile spouse, requiring the use of a surrogate mother, and there
is no statute in place outlining the consequences in such a situation. 2 5
The court attempts to consider the application of Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. c. 46 § 4B to this case and determines that if the statute applied,
the biological father of the child would be the husband of the surrogate mother. 20 6 Because situations such as this one could arise, where
the surrogate mother's husband consents to the procedure, but has no
intent on being the father of the child, the court determined that it is
doubtful that the Legislature intended this statute to apply to the child
20'See

R.R. v. M.H & Another, 426 Mass. at 512, 689 N.E.2d at 797

(deciding that surrogacy contracts are not inherently unlawful).
202Id. at 513, 689 N.E.2d at 797. The court states that a better procedure
than the one described with many conditions imposed is that of judicially
approved agreements prior to conception as in Virginia and New Hampshire. Id.
201See id. at 509-11, 689 N.E.2d at 795-97 (discussing laws surrounding
parentage in an artificial insemination situation and adoption).
204See id. at 509, 689 N.E.2d at 795 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
46, § 4B (West 1996)). This statute states if a mother's husband consents to the
procedure, the resulting child is considered the legitimate child of the mother and
her husband. Id. While this section sets out the guidelines for the legitimacy of
the child, it does not comment on the rights and obligations of the biological
father. Id.
205 See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass.
at 509, 689 N.E.2d at 795
(stating the difference between surrogate motherhood and fatherhood and the
issue of anonymity).
206 See id. at 510 (resulting from surrogate mother's husband consenting to
the procedure).
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of a married surrogate mother.2 0 7 For this reason, the court does not
use the statute to assist in the decision concerning the enforceability
of the surrogacy arrangement. 2° '
In addition to the parentage statute discussed above, the court
looked to the policies underlying the adoption legislation of Massachusetts.20 9 Although the adoption legislation has no application in
the matter of child custody, which is at issue here, it can provide
guidance as far as the issue of consent.21 0 It is the normal expectation
in the case of a surrogacy agreement that the father's wife will adopt
the child with the consent of both the mother and father. 211 The
problem with surrogacy agreements is that the consent of the mother
is often given before the birth of the child, however, under the statutes in place, this consent to adoption is not to be executed "sooner
than the fourth calendar day after the date of birth of the child to be
adopted., 21 2 Even though the statute is in place for adoption cases,
the standard should be expanded to state that no mother may agree to
surrender the custody of her child earlier than the fourth day after its
birth.213 In addition, private agreements concerning adoption and
custody are inconclusive because a judge must look to214the best interest of the child when making a decision about custody.
id. (applying § 4B to this case would make unsupportive husband of
surrogate the father of the child).
208See id. at 509-10, 689 N.E.2d at 795 (deciding that § 4B is intended to
207See

apply to a fertile mother whose husband consented to her artificial insemination
for their own familial purposes).
'09
See id. at 510-11, 689 N.E.2d at 796 (suggesting surrogate agreement
should have no effect).
20 See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. at 510-11, 689 N.E.2d at 796
(requiring consent be given only after reasonable time passed following birth of
child).
2. See id. at 510, 689 N.E.2d at 796 (questioning adoption statute which
does not require consent of mother's husband in surrogacy situation).
212See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §
213See id. (acknowledging importance of mother's

2 (West 1996)).
bond with child and

time it takes to develop).
214 See id. at 510-11, 689 N.E.2d at 795-96 (indicating that the best interest
of the child is of major import).

338

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. IV

Another issue in question surrounds the payment made to surrogate mothers as outlined in the agreement. 2 5 Adoptive parents may
pay the expenses of the birth mother, but may not make any direct
payments to her.2 16 The court looked to the surrogacy arrangement
and decided that Mr. Rascoe was promised more than the services of
Ms. Hoaglund in carrying the child; he was promised the surrender of
the custody of her child.2 17 The SJC stated in dicta that, "[t]he
statutory prohibition of payment for receiving a child through adoption suggests that, as a matter of policy, a mother's agreement to surrender custody in exchange for money (beyond pregnancy-related expenses) 8should be given no effect in deciding the custody of the
21
child.
In deciding this case of first impression, the court recognized that
"there is nothing inherently unlawful in an arrangement by which an
informed woman agrees to attempt to conceive artificially and give
birth to a child whose father would be the husband of an infertile
wife., 2 19 However, the court does have a problem with surrogacy
arrangements, like the one involved in the case at hand. 220 This is so
because of the compensation paid beyond pregnancy related expenses
and because the birth mother is bound by her consent to the father's
custody of the child which is made before a reasonable period of time
has elapsed following the birth of the child. 22' The court lists six
other conditions, beyond those of payment and consent, that it found
important in deciding whether a surrogacy arrangement is enforce-

225

See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. at 511-12, 689 N.E.2d at 796-

97 (indicating that father was promised more than just services for the payment).
216 See id. at 511, 689 N.E.2d at 796 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
210, § 1IA (West 1996); 102 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 102, § 5.09 (1997)).
217See id. at 511, 689 N.E.2d at 796 (permitting mother to assert custody
rights only upon reimbursement of payment and expenses incurred).
218 id.
219
220

Id. at 512, 689 N.E.2d at 797.
See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. at 512, 689 N.E.2d at 797

(indicating that the court disapproves of some surrogacy arrangements).
221See id. at 512, 689 N.E.2d at 797 (providing reasons why the court
rejected the surrogacy arrangement at hand).
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able. 222 Although the court found the surrogacy arrangement, as set
out by the parties involved in this case, unenforceable, the court did
not state, per se, that surrogacy agreements are void in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.223
V. FUTURE STATE OF REPRODUCTIVE LAW
The holding provided by the SJC in R.R. v. MH & Another did

not directly address the question of what the future will hold for reproductive law in Massachusetts. 224 However, the court did provide,
in dicta, some very persuasive suggestions for the legislature indicating what they would like to see in the future with respect to surrogacy
agreements.225 While the court held that the surrogacy agreement at
issue was invalid, the court outlined ways interested parties could
overcome the obstacles the Rascoes and Hoaglunds met.226 In addition, the SJC suggested judicially approved surrogacy agreements as a
procedure which will allow individuals to conceive artificially without
222 See

id. (listing important conditions in deciding enforceability of

surrogacy arrangement). The other conditions the court will consider may
include such a requirement that:
(a) the mother's husband give his informed consent to the agreement in
advance; (b) the mother be an adult and have had at least one successful pregnancy; (c) the mother, her husband, and the intended parents
have been evaluated for the soundness of their judgment and for their
capacity to carry out the agreement; (d) the father's wife be incapable
of bearing a child without endangering her health; (e) the intended
parents be suitable persons to assume custody of the child; and (f) all
parties have the advice of counsel.
Id.
223 See generally id. at 512-13, 689 N.E.2d at 797 (holding surrogacy
contract at hand unenforceable).
224R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 426 Mass. at 512, 689 N.E.2d at 797
(1998).
225 See id. (stating the court's suggestions for overcoming legal obstacles
of surrogacy agreements). The court stated that if no compensation beyond
pregnancy related expenses are paid and if the mother is bound by her consent to
the father's custody of the child only after a specified time has passed following
the birth of the child, the consent of the mother would be enforceable. Id.
226 See id. (outlining conditions that would be important in determining the
validity of a surrogacy contract).
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the barriers that are currently present. 227 In short, the SJC would like
to see a statute in Massachusetts, concerning surrogacy agreements,
which will provide guidance to judges, lawyers and all individuals interested in either surrogate parenthood or becoming a surrogate
mother.2 28

The future of reproductive law, and specifically surrogacy, is a
question posed to all states, not only Massachusetts. 229 Because of
the widespread problem, the ABA Section of Family Law is drafting a
model act in an attempt to resolve some of the controversial issues
raised by assisted reproductive technology.230 The Committee on the
Laws of Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetics is working
to provide guidelines for legislators and judges to consider as they
begin drafting the much needed laws on the issue and rendering decisions in current controversies.23 ' The action taken by these committee individuals is in response to the recurring theme
in case decisions
2
that there should be some legislation on the issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of the different methods of assisted reproductive technology has become an increasingly popular resource for couples
wishing to have a family despite biological obstacles of one of the
parties. In fact, a popular television situation comedy has introduced
233
the issue of surrogacy into the storyline of one of its characters.
227See

id. (suggesting a similar procedure as is followed in other states).

Both Virginia and New Hampshire allow surrogacy agreements that are judicially
approved prior to conception. Id.
228 See id. at 513, 689 N.E.2d at 797 (desiring legislation
to guide
individuals interested in and involved with the issue).
229See Debra Baker, Conceiving Solutions, ABA JOURNAL, Dec. 1998 at
78 (drafting of model act to aid all states with the issue).
230 See id. (responding to the questions raised by the technological
advances).
231See id. (hoping the guidelines will assist the individuals responsible for
the future of assisted reproductive technology).
232See id. at 79 (understanding that case law is not enough).
233 See Friends (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 8, 1998) (using one
character as surrogate mother for brother and his wife).
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The prevalence of these situations mean a difficult road ahead for the
courts which have not yet faced the reality that existing legislation is
in no way equipped to handle the issues that are certain to arise. In
some ways, Massachusetts has prepared itself for some scenarios,
such as those involving artificial insemination, but the main problem
for this state is the lack of any law providing guidance for the court in
deciding a case that involves the use of a surrogacy contract. Because of this void in the legislation, Massachusetts is forced to look to
the decisions of other jurisdictions. However not all jurisdictions
have ruled consistently. The SJC realized the importance of these
arrangements and the opportunities they can provide and ruled accordingly. However, the most beneficial act for this new technology
would be legislation which can guide individuals on the issues.
Rena Deutscher

